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Sammendrag 
Handel med klimakvoter blir gjerne begrunnet med at det fører til en kostnadseffektiv reduksjon av 
utslippene. Vi viser imidlertid at dersom handel med kvoter skjer mellom land, og ikke bedrifter, så 
holder ikke lenger nødvendigvis argumentet om kostnadseffektivitet.  
 
I et kvotemarked hvor nasjoner deltar, vil land kunne få ekstrainntekter gjennom å rense mer utslipp 
hjemme for så å selge utslippskvoter ute. Det er muligheten for slike ekstra inntekter som kan gjøre 
kvotemarkedet ineffektivt. Land krever inn skatter for å kunne fordele inntekt og tilby sine innbyggere 
offentlige goder. Dersom et land mangler tilstrekkelige skatteinntekter for å kunne løse disse 
oppgavene, gir dette et ekstra incentiv til å selge utslippskvoter. Land hvor dette incentivet er til stede 
vil typisk rense sine utslipp mer enn det som er kostnadseffektivt, mens land med tilstrekkelige 
skatteinntekter vil rense for lite i forhold til hva som er kostnadseffektivt.  Videre vil markedsprisen på 
utslippskvoter presses ned, og prisen vil ikke lenger reflektere miljøkostnaden ved utslipp. 
 
Man kan tenk seg ulike løsninger på problemet: Den initiale kvotetildelingen kan tilgodese land med 
lav fiskal kapasitet slik at deres incentiv til å selge for mange kvoter blir mindre, eller man kan la 
bedriftene i de ulike land delta i kvotemarkedet direkte. Hvis da i tillegg kvotene auksjoneres ut, og 
inntektene fra kvotesalget tilkommer land med lav fiskal kapasitet, kan global velferd øke 
1 Introduction
The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has as its ultimate objective to
stabilize concentrations of greenhouse gasses (GHGs) in the atmosphere at a level that prevents
dangerous anthropogenic inferences with earths climate system. In order to meet this objective,
international climate negotiations have proceeded along the following track: First, set a global
cap for emissions, then allocate the global cap to nations, and, lastly, allow nations to trade in
emission permits. The cap and trade mechanism is said to be characterized by two favorable
features. First, it minimizes global pollution abatement costs for any given global cap, a result which
dates back to the literature on the optimal regulation of environmental pollutants (Dales, 1968).
Second, the national caps can be allocated according to the principle of common but di¤erentiated
responsibilities (UNFCCs Article 3.1)  implying a compensation to countries whose histories
leave them with particularly high burdens from emission trading  without impeding e¢ ciency
(Montgomery, 1972).
We demonstrate, however, that global GHG cap and trade across countries introduces a scal
incentive which may hamper the simple text book notion of cost e¢ ciency. Crucial to our argu-
ment is that national governments may be scally constrained that is, they are unable to tax the
private sector su¢ ciently to nance their rst-best levels of public spending. A scally constrained
government will have the incentive to close its scal gap through the use of any available instru-
ment, including emission trading. We show that if one or more countries are scally constrained,
greenhouse gas (GHG) abatement costs will no longer be minimized even if a global permit market
is established. Moreover, the permit price will be below the cost e¢ cient permit price. Finally,
the initial allocation, or a reallocation, of emission permits will a¤ect both the price on emission
permits and the global distribution of GHG abatement e¤ort.
As long as abatement costs are not minimized, there are potential gains that possibly can
be exploited by changing the cap and trade institution. First, we show that a restriction on
permit sales, as advocated by the supplementary principle in the Kyoto treaty, does not lead to
lower abatement costs. In order to improve on the permit market equilibrium the institutional
change must break the direct connection between a national governments abatement policy and
its budget. One candidate solution could be global auctioning of emission permits directly to rms,
and transfers of the revenues from the auctioning to nations by a predetermined scheme. We show
that this improves global welfare in our static setup, and in fact this is the way in which the EU
ETS heading.1
As an extension, we also discuss how a cap and trade system carries with it adverse dynamic
e¤ects. First, since access to the permit market e¤ectively equips scally constrained countries
with a powerful scal instrument, their incentive to invest in improving their ability to collect taxes
will be weakened. Then, if di¤erent dimensions of state capacities act as strategic complements (as
in, e.g., Besley and Persson, 2011), economic development may be hampered. Second, the permit
price in scally unconstrained countries will be lower than marginal environmental damage which,
in turn, provides too weak incentives for research and development of new pollution abatement
technology. Thus, the cost of abatement in future periods may be higher compared to a situation
in which the price on emissions is equal to marginal environmental damage in all countries.
That countries may be scally constrained is not at all new to the economics literature. Cukier-
man, Edwards and Tabellini (1992) di¤ers between a tax reform and scal policy. Fiscal policy is
the choice of tax rates and level of government spending. A tax reform is the broad design of a tax
1See http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm.
4
system which involves both the available tax base and technology for collecting taxes. While scal
policy can be changed from year to year, a tax reform takes several years, and thus, scal policy
can be constrained in the short run. Besley and Persson (2011) formalizes the distinction between
scal policy and tax reforms by assuming that the government cannot collect more than a given
share of private income as taxes in a given year. We say that the country is scally constrained, if
the government could have improved welfare by collecting a higher share of private income,
The scal stance in many developing countries may serve as examples of scal constrainedness.
It is well documented that the lack of an e¤ective technology for collecting taxes prevents several
developing country governments from raising the amount of government funds needed for the -
nancing of a socially desirable level public goods spending, such as spending on basic health and
schooling services, or on economically sound public infrastructure investments.2 Additionally, the
use of advanced transfer pricing techniques by large multinational companies, and organizational
issues at the lower bureaucratic level, including corrupt practices, severely limits the scal capacity
in many of these countries. According to a joint report by the IMF, OECD, UN and WB, [...] half
of sub Saharan African countries still mobilize less than 17% of their GDP in tax revenues [...].3
Countries may also be occasionally scally constrained. Generally, this can happen for two
di¤erent sets of reasons. First, a governments capacity to raise funds may temporally shift down
below the capacity needed to nance a given level of socially optimal level of public goods. This
may occur if the economy is hit by a negative shock to productivity or to aggregate demand (an
economic depression), if there is a sudden increase in the price of government funding due to, e.g.,
international nancial stress, or if the economy experiences a massive migration of parts of the tax
base.4 Second, at any given level of scal capacity, a government may become temporarily scally
constrained if there is a positive shock to the marginal social benet of public funds. Economists
and economic historians have extensively analyzed how both intrastate and interstate conicts, or
wars, suddenly and signicantly increases the scal needs of countries, often beyond their current
scal capacities.5
The technical point of departure for our model setup is a standard cap and trade model where
we assume the existence of an international agreement on the overall cap on global GHG emis-
sions. Emission permits can be traded costlessly among the countries. Subject to the allocation of
emission caps, the governments can freely set their national abatement targets. The benevolent gov-
ernments in our model ultimately care about household welfare, which derives from the households
consumption of both private and public goods. Households, in turn, derive income from industrial
production with GHG as a by-product, and the national governments nance public goods provision
through the taxation of household income. Additionally, however, the governments can also collect
funds from trading in emission permits.
2For a broad documentation of the weak scal capacity among developing countries, see UNDP (2011, Ch. 7).
Indeed, Besley and Persson (2013) lists as a stylized fact that, due to lack of e¤ective tax technology and widespread
tax evasion: Rich countries collect much higher tax revenue than poor countries despite comparable statutory rates.
3The full reference reads: International Monetary Fund, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment, United Nations, and World Bank (2011). This report states that (2011, p.9) the identication of ways to help
developing countriestax Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) through e¤ective transfer pricingis one of ve requests
asked by the G-20 to help raise the scal capacity in developing countries. Khan (2006) discusses the relationship
between scal capacity and corruption in developing countries.
4Notice that nancial crises is even more critical for the ability to raise public funds and, hence, the ability to
optimally adjust scal policy among those developing countries with the lowest level of scal capacity (World Bank,
2009).
5See, e.g., Dincecco and Prado (2012), Dincecco and Katz (2012), Gennaioli and Voth (2011), Hintze (1906), Tilly
(1975; 1990).
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If governments are free to raise whatever amount of funds they desire through taxation, scal
policy, on one hand, and the abatement policy, on the other hand, are e¤ectively separated in
the governmentswelfare maximization problem. Then, the equilibrium level of public spending
coincides with the rst-best preferred level and the government optimally sets the national emission
level such that the marginal industrial cost of abatement is equal to the equilibrium price of emission
quotas. If some of the governments are scally constrained, however, the optimally chosen levels of
emissions in these countries are also inuenced by their respective marginal utilities of public goods
provision. In market equilibrium, the scal incentive of those countries that are scally constrained
will be transmitted to all participating countries through the equilibrium price of emission permits.
Hence, also the abatement levels of scally unconstrained countries will be a¤ected, and the global
market equilibrium is no longer cost e¢ cient.
One fundamental assumption that we make is that governments are always fully capable of
setting a national emission target, and enforce this in a cost e¢ cient way. We consider this to be a
natural benchmark, which also underlines the robustness of our results. Our analysis demonstrates
that even with perfectly e¤ective market institutions, and even if national governments are fully
benevolent social welfare maximizers, the occasional event of scal stress will generally render
the permit market cost ine¢ cient. Alternatively, one could imagine that a scally constrained
government regulates emissions through brute force; the most straightforward way would simply be
to force those polluting industries that contribute the least to social welfare to shut down. Such a
country would likely not be abating its emissions e¢ ciently, however, the scal incentive created by
the permit market would still apply and probably amplify the loss from the ine¢ cient regulation
of emissions.
Our paper relates to a larger literature on how ine¢ ciencies in the organization of the market
for emission permits and di¤erent structural characteristics in local markets may induce a subop-
timal market allocation of abatement. Hagem and Westskog (1998) analyze the e¤ect of imperfect
competition in the permit market, and shows that introducing durable permits e.g., permits that
last for more than one period can limit the problem with market power. Moreover, Hagem and
Westskog (2009) shows that a dominant player in the permit market can behave competitively if
the allocation of permits in period t + 1 depends on the price observed in period t. Babiker et al.
(2004) analyze how pre-existing distortions in the economy of the countries participating in permit
trade may erode the gains from this trade. This happens because there is a di¤erence between
private marginal abatement costs and social marginal abatement cost. We note that these types of
ine¢ ciencies will come on top of the ine¢ ciencies associated with the scal incentive that we study
here. Finally, there is a large literature on the Kyoto protocol discussing and analyzing how its
exible mechanisms (permit trade in various forms) may lead to ine¢ ciencies, as in, e.g., Barrett
(1998), Weyant (1999) and Springer (2003).
Also other and less formal contributions have warned that trading in emissions permits among
nations might lead to undesired outcomes. Lohmann (2006) argues that it (p.18): "encourages the
industries most addicted to coal, oil and gas to carry on as before". Victor and Cullenward (2007)
are sceptical to cap and trade for several reasons, one being that it "might impede wise planning
due to volatile prices". The EU has also been hesitant to fully accept the e¢ ciency properties of
cap and trade, and during the Kyoto negotiations they insisted on the "supplementary principle"
in order to ensure that permit trading should not lead to too little abatement in the Kyoto Annex
1 countries (UN, 2000).6
6Supplementarity refers to the concept that internal abatement of emissions should take precedent before external
participation in exible mechanisms. These mechanisms include emissions trading, Clean Development Mechanism
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Finally, our paper relates to the so-called resource curse literature which informs us that
when a country is endowed with a valuable and tradable resource, political incentives may distort
economic policies and outcomes. In particular, this may happen when democratic institutions are
weak, or when there is a high degree of political instability (Robinson et al., 2006).7 Translated into
the context of cap and trade, insights from this literature suggest that a non-democratic government
may choose to abate more than the technically cost e¤ective level of abatement, in order for the
political elite enrich themselves or their partisans through the sale of emission permits at the world
market. We show, however, that one need not resort to political economy distortions of any kind
for the scal incentive to hamper economic e¢ ciency.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and the
economic environment. In Section 3, we analyze the incentives of scally unconstrained and scally
constrained countries, and derive the comparative statics. The market equilibrium is analyzed in
Section 4, and this is illustrated with a numerical model in Section 5. Section 6 includes a number
of extensions including a discussion of a global emission tax regime instead of a global permit trade
regime. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 The world
We consider a world consisting of n heterogenous countries. Each country is populated by a large
number of identical households, and their economies are administered by national, welfare maxi-
mizing governments. We assume that n is su¢ ciently large, and each single country i, i = 1; :::; n,
su¢ ciently small, such that all countries and their respective governments behave as price takers
on the world market.
World aggregate emissions E lead to global environmental damages D(E). We assume that
there exists a global climate agreement that puts a cap on global emissions E, and that allocates
emission quotas to countries. The treaty also ensures that each countrys level of emissions does
not exceed the countrys holding of emission quotas. The global emission target, E, is strictly lower
than the historical level of emission, E <
P
n ei0, where ei0 is the historical level of emission in
country i. Moreover, the target is distributed to the countries according to ei = #iei0; #i  1.
Finally, the target, E, is optimal in the sense that it minimizes the sum of environmental costs
D(E) and pollution abatement costs CG(E).
2.2 Households
Households derive income from industrial production with GHG emissions as a necessary by-
product. The level of industrial income in country i can be represented as
i (ei) = 
i   Ci (ei) ; (1)
where ei is the level of emission in country i and the abatement technology Ci (ei) reects the
countrys industrial characteristics, and where Cie (ei)  0 and Ciee (ei)  0 for ei  ei0. The
(CDM), and Joint Implementation (JI). The supplementarity principle is found in three articles of the Kyoto Protocol:
article 6 and 17 with regards to trading, and article 12 with regards to the clean development mechanism.
7See, e.g., van der Ploeg (2011) for a broad review of the resource curse literature, and Morrison (2010) on foreign
aid and its parallels with the resource curse.
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marginal cost of abatement in country i is then given by  Cie (ei), as in, e.g., Rubin (1996).
The income of households from production, i (ei), is taxed at the at rate ti. Assuming that
households derive utility from consuming their net income, yi, and that they also value public goods
consumption, Gi, we can write the preferences of the households as
ui
 
yi (ti; ei) ; G
i

= wi
 
yi (ti; ei)

+ hi
 
Gi

; (2)
where
yi (ti; ei) = (1  ti)i (ei) ; (3)
and where the Inada conditions apply to both wi () and hi ().8
2.3 Governments and GHG emissions
Governments are free to determine their respective national levels of GHG emissions. For instance,
the national governments may allocate permits among the national emitters and monitor emissions
themselves, or they may delegate this to a separate body; anyway, we assume that the emission
level set by the national governments will be respected. To the extent that the governments set
their national levels of GHG emissions di¤erent from their national quotas, they may trade their
respective residual emission permits on an international market. When deciding on its preferred
level of emissions, the government in each country will take into account the equilibrium price of
emission permits in the market, as well as the social costs and benets to the country of emission
trading.
Country is net revenue from trading emission permits, which may be positive or negative, is
given by peq (ei   ei), where peq: is the equilibrium permit price on the world market. How this
net revenue is allocated between the government and the households depends on the scal and
environmental institutions in the country. In the following, we assume that the entire net revenue
from emissions trading accrues to the government, however, this constraint can easily be relaxed.
We also assume that the national emission target is grandfathered to the private sector, and hence,
that the government does not use a permit auction.9
In addition to regulating the levels of emission in their respective countries, the countries
governments are responsible for the provision of public goods. We assume that the governments
freely decide on a tax rate ti on private income, and a level of public goods provision Gi, so as to
maximize social welfare. The tax rate in any country i is, however, potentially constrained by the
8The Inada conditions imply: wiy (yi) > 0; w
i
yy (yi) < 0; lim
y !0w
i
y (yi) = 1; limy !1w
i
y (yi) = 0; h
i
G (Gi) >
0; hiGG (Gi) < 0; limG !0
hiG (Gi) = 1; limG !1h
i
G (Gi) = 0. Notice that welfare is an implicit function of the level of
abatement. This setup covers a broad range of abatement cost structures, such as, e.g., C (ci; ei) = cif (ei), ci > 0,
where f () is continuously di¤erentiable and satises the (inverse Inada) conditions: f (ei) > 0 for any ei  0;
fe (ei) < 0; fee (ei) > 0; lim
ei !0
fe (ei) = 1; lim
ei !1
fe (ei) = 0. If wi = w (C (ci; ei)) > 0, wC < 0, and wCC = 0,
then welfare will be increasing (decreasing) at a decreasing (increasing) rate in the level of emission (abatement) and
decreasing in ci: wie (eijci)  wCcife (ei) > 0; wiee (eijci)  wCcifee < 0; wic (eijci)  wCf (ei) < 0. The restriction
wCC = 0 simplies the expressions, but could easily be replaced by other and more general assumptions on the shape
of w () for which wiee < 0.
9 In the Appendix we extend the model in two ways: (A1) We allow the government to obatin additional income
from auctioning of permits nationally; (A2) we allow the proceeds from emission trading to be split among the
government and the households. All of our main results regarding the ine¢ ciency of cap and trade remain invariant
to these extensions, however, some of the comparative statics change.
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countrys scal capacity,  i 2 (0; 1) implying
ti   i: (4)
To cite Besley and Persson (2010): "In concrete terms,  represents scal infrastructure such
as a set of competent tax auditors, or the institutions necessary to tax income at the source or to
impose a value-added tax". For some countries, the scal capacity constraint may (occasionally) be
binding, while for others it may not. The governments budget constraints can then be stated as
Gi (ti; ei)  tii (ei) + peq: (ei   ei) : (5)
The governments maximize welfare with respect to the tax rate and the level of emissions,
max
ti;ei
ui
 
yi (ti; ei) ; G
i (ti; ei)

= max
ti;ei

wi
 
yi (ti; ei)

+ hi
 
Gi (ti; ei)

; (6)
subject to the constraints given by inequalities (4) and (5).
Notice that our assumptions about the properties of wi () and hi () imply that the budget
constraint, but not necessarily the scal constraint, holds with equality.
3 Taxation, public goods provision and emissions
3.1 Optimal policy when the scal constraint is not binding
In the continuation, we drop the country indexation i until we consider the market equilibrium in
Section 4. In order to save notation, we denote i (ei) and ui
 
yi (ti; ei) ; G
i (ti; ei)

by i and ui,
respectively, and denote the rst derivatives of w (), h (), and C () by wy, hG, and Ce, respectively,
noting that all of these are functions of all of the exogenous variables and the parameters of the
model (i.e., of e,  , and ).
Given that each country is too small to take into account its own impact on the equilibrium
price, peq:, the respective governmentsobjective function can be restated as
max
t;e

w
 
(1  t)  i   C (e)
+h (t (   C (e)) + peq: (e  e))

; (7)
which is solved subject to Eq. (4). If the scal constraint is not binding, the two rst order
conditions simplify, after rearranging, to:
hG = wy; (8)
 Ce = peq:: (9)
Hence, when the scal constraint is not binding, the decisions on taxation and public spending
on the one hand, and which emission level to implement on the other hand, are e¤ectively separated.
Fiscal policy, t and G, should then be set such that the marginal utility from private consumption,
wy, is equal to the marginal utility from consumption of the public good, hG, and the level of
emission should be such that the marginal abatement cost,  Ce is equal to the equilibrium price
of emission permits, peq:.
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Optimal policy can be derived from the rst order conditions. From Eq. (8) we have that the
optimal level of public goods provision is given by
G = h 1G (wy) ; (10)
where h 1G () is the inverse of hG, and the superscript  indicates that the allocation is consistent
with the rst-best scal policy vector of the welfare maximizing government. By Eq. (9), the
optimal level of emission of the country is given by
e = C 1e (p
eq:) : (11)
where C 1e () is the inverse of  Ce.
Finally, the welfare maximizing tax rate is found by inserting from equations (10) and (11) into
the government budget constraint in Eq. (5),
t =
G   peq: [e  e]
   C (e) : (12)
The expression in Eq. (12) implies that the optimal tax rate in a scally unconstrained country,
t, can be negative if the amount of quotas allocated to the country, e, is su¢ ciently high. A negative
tax rate can be interpreted as the government redistributing to the households the residual of its
proceeds from trading in emission permits, subject to providing the optimal amount of public goods
provision.
3.2 Optimal policy in scally constrained countries
In the event that the scal constraint, given by Eq. (4), is binding, the government optimally
sets tc =  , and maximizes its objective function, Eq. (7), with respect to ei. Notice that a
scally constrained government ideally would like to set t even higher, but that the scal capacity
of the country renders such a policy not feasible. The associated rst order condition of a scally
constrained country is then given by
[peq    ( Ce)]hG = (1  ) ( Ce)wy: (13)
On the left hand side of (13) we have the marginal e¤ect of more abatement on the utility from
public spending. As long as peq is higher than  ( Ce), the government can increase its public
spending by demanding more abatement from the private sector in exchange with more permit
sales, which has a value of hG. On the right hand side of (13) we have the marginal e¤ect of more
abatement on the utility from private income.
Reorganizing Eq. (13), the rst order condition for the scally constrained country can be stated
as
 Ce hG + (1  )wy
hG
= peq:: (14)
Note that the government no longer equates marginal abatement cost with the permit price.
In Eq. (14), the left hand side represents the marginal social cost of abatement, including how
abatement a¤ects the provision of public goods in the country. Interpreting Eq. (14), and comparing
with the cost e¢ cient allocation in Eq. (9), we obtain the following result for the optimal level of
emissions, ec, in a scally constrained country:
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Proposition 1 If a country goes from being scally unconstrained to being scally constrained, its
level of emissions will decrease, i.e., ec < e.
Proof. Comparing equations (9) and (14), notice that hG+(1 )wyhG < 1 since, for any scally
constrained country,  2 (0; 1) and hG > wy. This implies that  Ce > peq, and hence that ec < e.
Global abatement costs CG( E) is given by
P
i C
i (ei). We know that ei , i = 1; :::; n, minimizes
CG for any global cap E. It then follows from Proposition 1 that global abatement costs will not be
minimized in a permit market equilibrium in which one or more countries are scally constrained.
Note that in Eq. (14), peq: and ei enter hiG through Gi, and that ei enters w
i
y through Ci.
Thus, without further assumptions about the shape of w (), h (), and C () we cannot solve for an
explicit expression for the level of emission by the constrained country, ec(peq). However, we can
still evaluate the comparative statics on ec with respect to the variables peq:, e, and  , noting that
peq: is considered exogenous to the single country.
3.3 Comparative statics
From equations (11) and (14), and taking into account that w (), h (), and C () are implicit
functions of all variables and parameters that are exogenous to the single country, it is clear that
both e and ec generally depends on e and peq:. The comparative statics of e and ec can be found
by implicit derivation of equations (11) and (14). We begin with the case when the government is
scally unconstrained and then move on to the case when the scal constraint is binding.
If scal capacity is not binding, implicit derivation of Eq. (11) with respect to e and the three
parameters peq:,  , and e gives:
de
dpeq:
=   1
Cee
< 0; (15)
de
de
= 0; (16)
de
d
= 0: (17)
Hence, a scally unconstrained countrys level of emissions depends exclusively on the equilib-
rium price of emission permits, and not on the quota allocation or the scal capacity. An increase
in the permit price induces the government to decrease the level of emission since the increased
price of permits makes selling emission permits more valuable than producing at the margin. The
results in equations (15) to (17) are standard results in the literature on emissions trading.
If a country is scally constrained, however, both  and e may matter for the governments
optimal level of emission. We di¤er between countries that are net sellers of permits, i.e., e ec > 0,
and countries that are net buyers, i.e., e  ec < 0. The comparative statics on the level of emission,
ec, can be found by implicit derivation of the rst order condition in Eq. (13), and we summarize
the results for a scally constrained country in the following propositions:
Proposition 2 For a scally constrained country which is a net buyer of emission permits we have
dec
dpeq: < 0, while for a scally constrained country which is a net seller of emission permits we have
dec
dpeq: T 0.
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Proof. First, implicit derivation of Eq. (13) with respect to ec and peq: gives
dec
dpeq:
= [  (hG   wy)  hGG [peq    ( Ce)] (e  ec)] =Ds; (18)
where
Ds =  
h
[wy + (hG   wy)  ] ( Cee) + hGG [ ( Ce)  peq:]2 + wyy [(1  ) ( Ce)]2
i
> 0: (19)
We have   (hG   wy) < 0 and  hGG [peq    ( Ce)] > 0. Hence, decdpeq: < 0 if e   ec < 0, and
ambiguous if e  ec > 0.
In the "net seller" case, there are two e¤ects pulling in di¤erent directions: On the one hand, a
higher permit price makes it more valuable on the margin to do abatement. Thus, the government
substitutes income from taxing the real economy with income from permit sales. On the other
hand, the income from permit sales increases which makes it less necessary to do extra abatement
to nance public goods. It it easy to see that the income e¤ect might dominate the substitution
e¤ect, for instance if the di¤erence e   ec is large, and we then have the counter-intuitive result
that a higher permit price leads to less supply of emission permits from the constrained country in
question, de
c
dpeq: > 0.
In case a scally constrained country receives a higher quota, the e¤ect of emissions is unam-
biguous:
Proposition 3 For a scally constrained country we have de
c
de > 0 independent of whether the
country is a net buyer or a net seller of emission permits.
Proof. Di¤erentiation of Eq. (13) with respect to e gives
dec
de
=  hGG [peq:    ( Ce)] peq:=Ds > 0: (20)
In this case there is only an income e¤ect: For a given level of emissions, setting a higher quota
reduces the money spent on permit acquisitions or increases the income from permit sales. Hence,
the country nds it less necessary to do abatement to nance public goods. Finally, we take a look
at the e¤ect of an increase in scal capacity:
Proposition 4 For a scally constrained country we have de
c
d > 0 independent of whether the
country is a net buyer or a net seller of emission permits.
Proof. Di¤erentiating Eq. (13) with respect to ec and  gives:
dec
d
= [(hG   wy) ( Ce)  (1  ) ( Ce)wyy   [peq    ( Ce)]hGG] =Ds > 0: (21)
Again we have a substitution e¤ect and an income e¤ect, but this time pulling in the same
direction. First, a higher income tax makes it more costly on the margin to do abatement since the
loss in scal income becomes higher when real output decreases. Thus, the government substitutes
income from permit sales with income from taxing the real economy by increasing emissions. Second,
for a given level of abatement scal income increases, which makes it less necessary to do extra
abatement to nance public goods.
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Comparing with the comparative statics for a scally unconstrained country it is clear from
Proposition 2-4 that a scally constrained country has di¤erent incentives when participating in a
global market for emission permits than do a scally unconstrained country. Notice in particular
that the allocation of emission quotas e may have real e¤ects since countries change their supply in
response to changes in emission quota allocations.
4 Market equilibrium
In this section, we analyze the market equilibrium in the permit market. The condition for market
clearing is given by:
E =
P
n ei: (22)
The market clearing condition in Eq. (22) implicitly pins down the equilibrium price peq:.
Denote scally unconstrained countries by j, and constrained countries by k. The equilibrium price
is then given implicitly from the following equation:X
j
ej (p
eq) +
X
k
eck (p
eq) = E (23)
The following proposition then follows:
Proposition 5 The equilibrium price in the case in which all countries are scally unconstrained
must be higher than the equilibrium price in the case in which one or more countries are scally
constrained as long as
 
hkG   wky
  hkGG peq   k   Cke  (ek   eck), 8k.
When a country goes from being scally unconstrained to being constrained, its equilibrium
level of emissions decreases (Proposition 1). Thus, we will have
P
j e

j (p
eq) +
P
k e
c
k (p
eq) < E. In
order to restore equilibrium in the permit market, the price has to fall such that both unconstrained
and constrained countries increase their emissions. Note that all constrained countries will react
in this way as long as the substitution e¤ect dominates the income e¤ect from a decline in the
equilibrium price peq e.g. (hG   wy) > hGG [peq    ( Ce)] (e  ec) (Proposition 2).
If (hG   wy) < hGG [peq    ( Ce)] (e  ec) for one or more countries k, these countries will
respond to a decreasing permit price by decreasing their emissions even more (Proposition 2).
Moreover, if this e¤ect dominates the increase in emissions from both unconstrained and constrained
countries for which (hG   wy)  hGG [peq    ( Ce)] (e  ec) still holds, the equilibrium price may
rise. As this seems unlikely, we will in the following assume that:
Assumption A1
 
hkG   wky

> hkGG

peq   k
  Cke  (ek   eck), 8k.
Notice that in the symmetric case where all countries are initially identical, we have ei  ei = 0.
Then, if one or more countries k become scally constrained, for example due to a sudden jump
in hkG, Assumption A1 will hold. More generally, Assumption A1 holds as long as the curvature of
hj () is relatively moderate, i.e., if the value
hjGG is relatively low.
Since the global cap is optimally set, the unconstrained market equilibrium must imply D0( E) =
C 0(ei )8i. We then also have:
Proposition 6 Given Assumption A1, the permit market equilibrium price in the case in which
one or more countries are scally constrained must be lower than marginal environmental damage.
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On the other hand, in countries that are scally constrained, we may have C 0(eci ) > D
0( E).
A change in the quota allocation could also have implications for the market equilibrium, as
given in Eq. (23). If a constrained country receives a higher emission quota, the country will
increase its emissions (Proposition 3). Thus, we will have
P
j e

j (p
eq) +
P
k e
c
k (p
eq) > E, and by
A1 the quota price has to increase. We then have the following proposition:
Proposition 7 In the case in which one or more countries are scally constrained, a change in
the quota allocation has real e¤ects, that is, it changes the equilibrium permit price, and hence also
the levels of abatement in both scally constrained and scally unconstrained countries.
This result has some resemblance with Hahns (1984) result, that when some country may obtain
market power in a global quota market, the market power problem can be removed by changing
the quota allocation. In our case it might be possible to allocate the quotas such that no country
is constrained in the permit market equilibrium. On the other hand, this may involve politically
infeasible allocations.
Note nally that, a change in scal capacity for any of the scally constrained countries will
have real e¤ects. Having established the properties of the permit market equilibrium with scally
constrained countries, we can move on to look at welfare e¤ects.
5 Welfare
5.1 Welfare with GHG cap-and-trade
How does the existence of a scal constraint in one or more countries a¤ect the welfare of scally
unconstrained countries? Fiscally unconstrained countries are only a¤ected through the permit
price. Subject to constraints (4) and (5), using the envelope theorem on Eq. (6) gives:
@ui
@peqi
= hiG (ei   ei) :
The permit price is lower in a scally constrained market equilibrium, and we therefore have
the following proposition:
Proposition 8 If one or more countries become scally constrained, scally unconstrained coun-
tries will gain if they are net buyers of emission permits before and after the change in the permit
price, and loose if they are net sellers of emission permits before and after the change in the permit
price.
For countries that change from being net sellers to become net buyers, we cannot say in what
direction their welfare changes.
One may wonder whether the existence of scal constraints constitutes an argument against
permit trade. In order to discuss global welfare further, we assume that the marginal utility from
income is equal to unity, wiy = 18i, and that the marginal utility of public goods is given by
hiG = 1 + i, where i  08i.10 Note that scally unconstrained countries, by denition, have
wiy = h
i
G, and hence i = 0. Welfare of the individual countries can then be written:
10With concave utility from both private and public goods, all redistribution of income from high income countries
to low income countries will improve global welfare. To isolate the e¤ect on global welfare of the allocation of
abatement e¤ort, we have to assume wg and hG constant.
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ui =

i   Ci(ei) + peq(ei   ei) if i = 0
i   Ci(ei) + peq(ei   ei) + i

 i(i   Ci(ei)) + peq(ei   ei)

if i > 0
Adding the welfare of the individual countries we obtain:
UC =
X
i
i   Ci(ei) +
X
k
k
k(k   Ck(ek)) + kpeq(ek   ek) (24)
where UC =
P
i u
i, k denote the additional terms due to the participation of scally constrained
countries, and i denote "all" countries, i.e., it denotes terms that are common to all (constrained
and unconstrained) countries. Maximizing welfare, as given by Eq. (24), with respect to the levels
of emission ej and ek under the constraint:X
j
ej +
X
k
ek = E
we obtain:
 Cje = 8j (25)
 Cke + kk( Cke)  kpeq = 8k
where  is the shadow cost of the global emission constraint. Thus, we have:
Proposition 9 Given wy = 1 and hiG = 1+i, the emission levels in any permit market equilibrium
maximizes global welfare irrespective of countries being scally constrained or not.
Proof. In the permit market equilibrium we have peq = . The conditions stated in (25) are then
identical to the conditions stated in the rst order conditions of the individual countries, conditions
(9) and (14).
The result should not be surprising. Although the permit market does not minimize global
abatement costs, it minimizes total cost e.g. forgone public goods and abatement costs. On the
other hand, the levels of public goods in one, more or all countries are not optimal due to the scal
constraint. Thus, if we could nd some mechanism that ensured equal marginal abatement costs
across countries, and at the same time provided income such that the level of public goods in all
countries stayed the same or increased, welfare would improve. We will look at this in the next
section.
We also have:
Proposition 10 Any restriction in the freedom of countries to buy and sell quotas, such as the
supplementary principle in the Kyoto treaty, must reduce global welfare.
The proposition follows directly from Proposition 9. The intuition is that the supplementary
principle will reduce demand for permits in the market. Consequently, the permit price has to fall
in order to reduce supply to the same extent. As noted in Proposition 8, the countries that sell
permits will then loose. Moreover, buyers may also loose since they are restrained from trading,
and in sum global welfare is reduced.11
11Notice, however, that more abatement is carried out in buyer countries, which may be good for dynamic e¢ ciency
since their "internal" price on emissions must have increased. We discuss dynamic e¢ ciency in more detail in sections
7.2 and 7.3.
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5.2 Welfare with global auctioning of permits
Since global abatement costs are not minimized, there are potential gains to be exploited. There
are at least two ways in which this can be done: Either the global treaty could x a global GHG tax
which is levied on all fossil fuels, or all permits could be auctioned by some supra-national authority
directly to the private sector in each country. Moreover, the income from the auction (tax) could be
redistributed to the countries by some predetermined scheme such that the link between national
emission levels and the amount of funds for public spending is taken away.12
We will look at a global auctioning system here. The total number of permits sums to E.
Denote the equilibrium price on permits in the global auctioning system by . Since all emitters
face this price, we will obtain the cost minimizing levels of emissions ei . The di¤erent participating
countrieslevels of welfare are then given by:
ui =

i   Ci(ei )  ei + 'i E if i = 0
(1   i)(i   Ci(ei )  ei ) + (1 + i)

 i(i   Ci(ei )  ei ) + #i E

if i > 0
where 'i is the predetermined level of redistribution of the income from the auction to the individual
countries. Adding the individual welfare levels we obtain:
U =
X
i
i   Ci(ei ) +
X
k
k

k(k   Ck(ek)  ek) + 'k E

(26)
where U =
P
i u
i, i.e., global welfare in the global auction case and k denotes the scally con-
strained countries. The di¤erence in global welfare between the global auction case and the cap
and trade case, i.e., Eq. (26) subtracted Eq. (24) is, after some rearranging, given by:
U   U c =
X
i

Ci(eCi )  Ci(ei )

+
X
k
k
k

Ck(eCk ) + e
C
k   Ck(ek)  ek

(27)
+
X
k
k

'k E   peq(ek   eCk )  keCk

The rst term in Eq. (27) is clearly positive since abatement costs are minimized when ei = ei 8i.
The second term is also positive since, given the emission tax , ej is the optimal level of emissions,
and thus the sum of permit aquisitions and abatement costs must be lower for ej than for e
C
j . Finally,
the third term is positive. This is more easy to see if we assume
P
k 'k = 1 and
P
k ek =
E, i.e., the
scally constrained countries get all the income from the auction; alternatively, they get the whole
emission cap. The term
P
k p
eq(ej   eCj ) must then be positive, and we can insert peq =  without
risking changing the sign from negative to positive. The last term in Eq. (27) is then reduced to:P
j j(1   j)eCj which is positive. Hence, we have:
Proposition 11 Global welfare WG can be increased if all permits are auctioned to the private
sector in each country by some supra-national authority, and the income from the tax is redistributed
to the countries in a predetermined way.
12This is the way in which the EU now has organized its permit trading system. That is, the commision auctions
permits to rms, and the proceedings is paid back to the member states by a predetermined scheme.
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Not all redistribution schemes will increase global welfare. The distribution scheme must take
into account that countries have di¤erent marginal utilities from public goods, s (or, alternatively,
that they are to di¤erent extents scally constrained) and di¤erent allocations, ei, such that an
improvement in total welfare results. The proposition also holds for a global tax.
Notice that for a global auction system to be consistent with a cost-e¤ective distribution of a
given level of global abatement across industries and countries, there must be a system for controlling
and enforcing emission levels in the private sector in each country.
6 A numerical example
In order to illustrate our analytical results, and also to get a feel for the potential magnitude of the
e¤ects we have found, we present a simple numerical simulation. The model countries are China,
the US, the EU, Brazil, Russia, Indonesia, India and Japan which together constitute nearly 70%
of global GHG emissions.13
We use current GDP for i, and set the marginal value of income to unity. For GHG abatement
costs, we use the cost function Ci (ei) = ci (ei0   ei)2, and calibrate the parameter ci by assuming
that it costs 5% of GDP to reduce region-specic business as usual emissions by 50%. This is at
the high end of most CGE studies on the topic (see e.g. Hoel et al. 2010). However, since the
cost function is country-specic, one would expect higher costs for each single country than for the
world as a whole.
For the value of the public good we use the function: Hi() = iGi   ii2 (Gi)2. We have data
for total taxes as a share of GDP for our eight model countries. Of our eight model countries,
China, India and Indonesia have particularly low tax rates. Hence, for these countries we calibrate
the model such that the marginal utility of public goods HiG = i   iiGi is greater than unity in
equilibrium.14
Our point of departure is that our eight countries must reduce their emissions by 20%. In
the unconstrained market equilibrium this would lead to a permit price of $100 per tonne CO2  
equivalent. Moreover, the countries together incur a total cost of 0:5 percent of their combined
GDP.
Then, when treating China, India and Indonesia as scally constrained, the market equilibrium
permit price drops, as shown in Figure 1.
13For data on emissions we draw on World Resources Institute. GDP data is from the World Bank. Lastly, data
on taxes is from the Heritage Foundation. For more details see the Appendix.
14See the Appendix for more on the calibration.
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Figure 1 "Permit price"
In Figure 1 we have set the marginal benet of public spending equal for China, India and
Indonesia, and have varied this from 1 to 3.5. Note that the permit price is lower the higher is the
marginal benet of public funds in the three scally constrained countries. We also compare three
di¤erent permit allocations: All, but US, EU and Japan, get their BaU emissions, all, but US, EU
and Japan, get 90% of their BaU emissions, and all countries get 80% of their BaU emissions. Note
that the price is a¤ected, that is, the lower the allocation to the scally constrained countries, the
lower the permit price.
The low permit price leads to an ine¢ cient allocation of GHG abatement across the countries,
that is, China, India and Indonesia abate too much and the other countries too little. In particular,
the US, the EU and Japan benet from the lower price on permits since they are net permit buyers.
In Figure 3 we measure the increase in global abatement costs as a function of the marginal
benet of public spending for China, India and Indonesia.
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Figure 2 "Percentage increase in global abatement costs"
Note that global abatement costs associated with the 20% reduction target increases steadily
as China, Indonesia and India stand to gain more and more, in terms of welfare at the margin,
on increasing their public spending. Note also that the initial allocation of permits decides global
abatement costs. While the other countries equate marginal abatement costs with the permit price,
these three countries balance reduced private income versus increased public spending through
selling more permits. The lower the initial allocation, the stronger is this incentive.
The three scally constrained countries hamper their possibilities to raise money for public
spending through the permit market by o¤ering too many permits. If some global regulator would
set the permit price to $100 (that is, the economically e¢ cient price), and all countries would adjust
their emissions such that their marginal abatement cost equated this price, world welfare would
indeed increase. This can be seen from the next gure, Figure 3, in which all countries, but US, EU
and Japan, get 90% of their BaU emissions. We then show the di¤erence in welfare between "the
xed $100 price equilibrium" and the realized permit market equilibrium in which scal incentives
drive China, Indonesia and India to sell too many permits.
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Figure 3 "Welfare comparison"
All countries except the US, the EU and Japan would gain on a xed price, economically e¢ cient
price on permits. World welfare also increases. Note that the higher welfare levels could also be
obtained by a global tax, and a redistribution scheme that resembled the permit allocations.
The incentive to o¤er too many permits is not taken away by restricting quota trade. In our
numerical example, we nd that limiting the market by not allowing any country to buy more
permits than their own reductions in emissions (from BaU), hampers global welfare. The permit
price decreases further, and all countries tend to loose - also those that are net buyers since they
must abate more.
7 Extensions and discussion
7.1 Letting the private sector trade emission permits
In our benchmark model, we assume that the net proceeds from emission trading ow directly
into (or out of) the governmentsfunds. Perhaps more realistically, the trade in emission permits,
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and the associated nancial ows, will be shared between the government and the private sector.
The e¤ects of allowing the private sector in our model the households, which owns and are the
recipients of the income from industrial production can be studied by assuming that a share 
(where we, for simplicity, ignore the country notation, i) of the net revenue from emission trading
accrues to the government, and the remaining share 1    enters into the budgets of households,
where  2 [0; 1]. We present this analysis and the associated results, including comparative statics
and the market equilibrium, in Appendix A2.
The main results from this extension is that GHG cap and trade still fails to be cost e¢ cient.
Intuitively, if only a small share of the revenues are directed towards the private sector, the s-
cally constrained governments faces a similar trade-o¤ as in the benchmark case. Specically, this
happens as long as  >  , implying that emission trading is scally more important (at the mar-
gin) than income from private sector production for the funding of public goods among the scally
constrained governments. In the case when  <  , however, this e¤ect is reversed; now, private
sector production is more important at the margin than emission trading. Hence, when only a
minor share of the proceeds from emission trading can be used directly for the nancing of public
goods, the scally constrained governments have the incentive to increase, rather than decrease,
their respective national levels of emission beyond the level which is consistent with global cost
e¢ ciency. In the special case when  = 0, the only source of government funding is through the
national tax base, hence, a scally constrained country has a strong incentive to increase the value
of this tax base by allowing for a higher level of national emissions, even if this means that the
private costs of abatement are higher than the cost e¢ cient level. The only case where the market
generally is cost e¢ cient, is in the case where i =  i, 8i.
Our model and analysis, hence, suggests that the scal incentives of scally constrained gov-
ernments hinders a globally cost e¢ cient distribution of abatement independent of the internal,
national organization of the split of revenues from emission trading between the public and the
private sector (except in the special, and very unlikely, case where i =  i, 8i). Whether the
latter case, of small is and a policy of underabatement, is relevant, is an open empirical ques-
tion. This, generally, depends on the extent to which the scally constrained governments can
incentivize, or force, private industries to expand their level of emission beyond the globally cost
e¢ cient level through the private purchase of emission permits at the international market. This,
in turn, depends on the policy instruments available to the scally constrained governments. One
such potential instrument could be a policy that decreases the e¤ective, national private price on
emissions, for example via a government subsidy of private sector emission permit purchases at the
international market.
7.2 Fiscal capacity dynamics
The scal capacities of countries are endogenous and will, hence, change over time. Notice, however,
that while the model we analyze is static, extending it to a dynamic framework is straightforward. In
such a framework, the scally constrained countries would optimally invest in expanding their scal
capacities subject to their rational expectations of future outcomes. These expectations include
the expected chance, and the associated social cost, of being scally constrained in the future, and
expectations about the nature of a future climate treaty.
If the cost for the government of adjusting scal capacity through investments is convex, as
in, e.g., Besley and Persson (2011), and future outcomes are uncertain, the optimal government
investment in scal capacity would be nonnegative, in any period. However, as long as governments
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are not too risk averse and/or that they discount future welfare by a factor strictly smaller than one,
the optimal investment path for scal capacity will never be so steep that it completely eliminates
the chance of ever being scally constrained in the future. Hence, one can easily extend the model
to a dynamic framework where countries will occasionally be scally constrained (according to some
stochastic process), and all of our results thus remain robust to endogenizing scal capacity.
Interestingly, an additional prediction from this type of dynamic model is that the incentives for
scally constrained governments to invest in scal capacity will be weakened by the introduction
of international cap and trade, the intuition being that cap and trade endows governments with
a scal instrument to partly alleviate their scal constrainedness.15 Hence, in addition to the
observation that the results from the static model also carry over to a dynamic setting, there would
be an additional e¤ect arising from the weakened incentives of scally constrained governments to
invest in future scal capacities. Notably, this latter e¤ect will slow down the pace at which the
most scally constrained countries gradually become less scally constrained over time, potentially
lowering the development prospects of these countries (Besley and Persson, 2013).16
7.3 R&D and dynamic e¢ ciency
Private investors spending resources on research and development (R&D) for developing better
pollution abatement techniques will look to the value of a potential patent when deciding how
much to invest (see e.g. La¤ont and Tirole, 1996). General, the higher the price on emissions, the
higher is the value of a patent, and only as long as peq: = D( E) can we expect the incentives for
R&D on pollution abatement techniques to be su¢ cient to compete with the incentives for R&D
on normal market goods. Proposition 6 suggests that peq: < D( E) in the market equilibrium in
which one or more countries are scally constrained. Thus, if the bulk of R&D happens in scally
unconstrained countries based on the price on emissions in these countries, we conjecture that cap
and trade could hamper dynamic e¢ ciency.
8 Conclusion
A largely ignored side-e¤ect of a cross-national cap and trade system for pollution control is that it
endows all participating governments with the opportunity to trade a valuable resource, the right to
emit GHG, in a liquid market. A scally constrained government should optimally take advantage
of this source of government funds to narrow its scal gap. Specically, a scally constrained
government should cut emissions until the real marginal social, rather than industrial, cost of
abatement equates the market price of emission permits. Consequently, if some (one or more)
countries are scally constrained, the e¢ ciency properties of a global GHG permit market are
hampered. First, marginal abatement costs will di¤er between countries, and GHG abatement
costs strictly dened will not be minimized. Second, the allocation of the global cap on GHG
will a¤ect the distribution of GHG abatement activities across the globe, and, hence, the level of
global welfare. This happens even if governments act as benevolent welfare maximizers. Finally,
15Besley and Persson (2013) discusses this type of dynamics in the case of aid and natural resources. As (potentially
large) caps to developing countries represent (potentially large) pure wealth transfers, their analysis straightforwardly
extends to the case of a Kyoto-type cap and trade system.
16Specically, economic development may be depressed if scal and other growth promoting state capacities (e.g.,
legal capacity) act as strategic complements, as in Besley and Persson (2011). Jensen (2011) presents evidence
suggesting that resource windfalls retards state capacity development, including scal capacity.
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we demonstrate our main results in a simple, numerical example. The numerical example also
demonstrates that an international emission tax regime that xes the carbon price may greatly
outperform cap and trade, the intuition being that a system where polluting activities are taxed
directly eliminates the scal incentive to abate.
Connecting scal policy and permit trade, as we do on our model, seems appropriate. Estimates
of the expected market value of GHG emissions trading range from about 15 to 900 billion USD.17
Hence, all participating countries in such a system will be endowed with a scarce and valuable
resource the permission to emit GHG gases which may be traded freely in a global market.
Consequently, governments will have the incentive to take into account the scal and social e¤ects
of such trade.
While this paper focuses on a specic source of ine¢ ciency in an international cap and trade
system, there may also be other, and potentially even more severe, problems with cap and trade.
The fact that developing countries are likely to have comparably lower GHG abatement costs than
developed countries implies that developing countries will be net sellers of emission permits. A
recent study by the IISD (2009) estimates that revenues from permit sales to developing countries
could reach $ 300 billion already in 2020. Such a large transfer to developing countries has close
resemblance with the discovery of a highly valuable renewable resource, or foreign aid. Might
revenues from emission trading also have negative resource curse e¤ects, as have been claimed
to be the case for natural resource income and aid? Given the evidence on the natural resource
curse (see van der Ploeg (2011) for an overview of this literature), and aid (Djankov, Montalvo
and Reynal-Querol, 2008) this possibility must be taken seriously. Natural resources and foreign
aid share several common characteristic: they can be appropriated by corrupt politicians without
having to resort to unpopular, and normally less protable, measures like taxation; the money from
aid and resource revenue often go directly into the hands of state leaders; the amount of revenues
from aid and resource income is not always transparent to the public; they produce foreign currency
earnings that, if not neutralized by monetary policy, will raise the real exchange rate, undermining
the competitiveness of other sectors. All of these characteristic could also be linked to revenues
from emission trading. This is another avenue by which permit trade can hamper the e¢ ciency
properties of permit markets through scal incentives which should be a topic of future research.
17According to a survey by Springer (2003), estimates of the average market volume is approximately 17 and 33
billion USD under global trading and Annex B trading, respectively. The International Institute for Sustainable
Development (IISD, 2009) estimates the development world revenue with 50 per cent of developed country demand
met by developing country credits to range from approximately 30 to 300 billion USD in 2020, and 90 to 900 billion
USD in 2050.
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Appendix
A1. Income from national permit market
In A1 we look at the situation in which the national government sets up its own national permit
market and auctions all national permits. The government still sets ei, but its budget constraint is
given by:
Gi (ti; ei)  ti

i   Ci (ei)  pi(ei)ei

+ pi(ei)ei + p
eq: (ei   ei)
where pi(ei) is the national price on emission quotas. It is easy to show that we must have p0i < 0.
The welfare expression is now given by:
ui = wi
 
(1  ti)

i   Ci (ei)  piei

+ hi
 
ti

i   Ci (ei)  piei

+ piei + p
eq: (ei   ei)

where pi = pi(ei). As above the government maximizes ui with respect to ei and ti. The rst order
condition with respect to the optimal national emission level writes:
dui
dei
= wy(1  ti) [ Ce   pi   p0iei] + hG(ti [ Ce   pi   p0iei] + pi + p0iei   peq:) = 0
Note that the government behaves as a monopolist, that is, takes into account that the national
price of permits depends on the national emission level. The private sector sets  Ce = pi. The
rst-order condition can thus be simplied to:
dui
dei
= (hG   wy)(1  ti)p0iei + hG(pi   peq:) = 0 (28)
For the optimal tax ti we have as before:
dui
dti
= (hG   wy)

i   Ci (ei)  piei

= 0:
Hence, a scally unconstrained government sets ei such that hG = wy and Eq. (28) can then only
hold if pi = peq:. Hence, ei is set such that pi(ei) = peq: and the cost e¢ cient outcome is reached.
On the other hand, the government might be scally constrained, that is ti >  i. The gov-
ernment will then set ti =  i, and we have hG > wy in equilibrium. From Eq. (28), note that
(hG   wy)(1   ti)p0iei < 0. Consequently, we must have hG(pi   peq:) > 0, which implies pi > peq:
and excessive abatement in scally constrained countries.
Thus, if the government can increase its public spending by auctioning quotas at home and
the government is scally constrained, the scal incentive still ruins the e¢ ciency properties of the
global permit market.
A2. Revenue sharing
Our baseline model implicitly assumes that a countrys net revenue from trading emission per-
mits accrues exclusively to the government of the country. Of course, this may not be the case, and
the exact revenue sharing between the government and the private sector will generally depend on
the scal and environmental institutions of the country. Here, we extend our model by introducing
a parameter, i, which characterizes how large share of the net revenue in country i which accrues
to the government, hence,
 
1  i is the share that is transferred to the households. The parameter
i can take any value between 0 and 1, i.e., i 2 [0; 1].
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As a result of this extension, a number of the baseline equations change. Below, we list the
modied equations, where we use the marker 0to indicate that the equation has been modied.
All the remaining equations remain unchanged.
The modied equations are:
yi = (1  ti)i + ri; (30)
where
ri =
 
1  i peq: (ei   ei) ;
Gi  tii + ipeq: (ei   ei) ; (50)
max
ti;ei

wi
 
(1  ti)
 
i   Ci (ei)

+
 
1  i peq: (ei   ei)
+hi
 
ti
 
i   Ci (ei)

+ ipeq: (ei   ei)
  ; (70)
t =
G   peq: [e  e]
   C (e) ; (12
0)
where the accompanying (unnecessary) restriction on e is
e < G=peq:   C 1e (peq:) ;
[ ( Ce)  peq:]hG = (1  ) peq:   (1  ) ( Ce)wy; (130)
 Ce = hG + (1  )wy
hG + (1  )wy p
eq:: (140)
As a result of these changes, optimal policy and the e¢ ciency properties of the model will be
modied. First, the results in Proposition 1 changes to the following: (i) If  6= , the level of
emission in a constrained country, ec, will not be cost e¢ cient; (ii) if  < , then  Ce > peq and
ec < e; (iii) if  > , then  Ce < peq and ec > e. The proof goes as follows. Comparing equations
(130) and (140), rst notice that cost e¢ ciency requires hG+(1 )wyhG+(1 )wy = 1, which is impossible if
 6=  . Second, replacing  =  + " in Eq. (140), and noticing that a constrained country is
characterized by hG   wy > 0, we have that  Ce R peq if 1 + "(hG wy)hG+(1 )wy R 1() " R 0. Hence,
 Ce R peq if  Q .
Notice that the main result concerning the cost ine¢ ciency if the level of emissions is robust
to this extension. Moreover, as long as the governments share of the net revenue from emissions
trading, , is larger than its share of production income,  , the scally constrained country will im-
plement a lower level of emissions than the cost e¢ cient level, ec < e. However, if the governments
share of the net revenue from emissions trading is lower than its share of production income, the
country will have higher emissions than what is cost e¢ cient, and the some of qualitative results
from the comparative statics change.
Comparative statics
Proposition 2 is modied as follows. A scally constrained country is characterized by hG > wy
and therefore optimally sets tc =  . Then:
dec
dpeq:
T 0 if

  (hG   wy)  +

wyy
wy
(1  ) + hGG
hG


hG [ ( Ce)  peq:] (e  ec)

T 0; (180)
dec
de
T 0 if  

wyy
wy
(1  )  hGG
hG


hG [ ( Ce)  peq:] peq: T 0: (200)
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dec
d
T 0 if

(hG   wy) ( Ce) 

wyy
wy
  hGG
hG

hG [ ( Ce)  peq:]

T 0 (210)
dec
d
T 0 if

  (hG   wy) 

wyy
wy
  hGG
hG

hG [ ( Ce)  peq:] (e  e)

peq: T 0 (A1)
The modied proof for Proposition 2 becomes: First, implicit derivation of Eq. (13) with respect
to ec and peq: gives
dec
dpeq:
= [  (hG   wy)  + [[(1  ) ( Ce)  (1  ) peq:]wyy (1  ) + [ ( Ce)  peq:]hGG] (e  e)] =Ds;
where
Ds =  
h
[wy + (hG   wy)  ] ( Cee) + hGG [ ( Ce)  peq:]2 + wyy [(1  ) ( Ce)  (1  ) peq:]2
i
> 0:
(190)
Eq. (13) implies that [(1  ) peq:   (1  ) ( Ce)] = [ ( Ce)  peq:] hGwy , which proves (18 0. Sec-
ond, di¤erentiation of Eq. (13) with respect to ec and e, and substituting back from Eq. (13),
gives
dec
de
=  

wyy
wy
(1  )  hGG
hG


hG [ ( Ce)  peq:] peq:=Ds;
which proves (20 0. Third, di¤erentiating (13) with respect to ec and  , and substituting back from
Eq. (13), gives
dec
d
=

(hG   wy) ( Ce) 

wyy
wy
  hGG
hG

hG [ ( Ce)  peq:]

=Ds
which proves (21 0. Finally, di¤erentiation of (13) with respect to ec and , and substituting back
from Eq. (13), gives
dec
d
=

  (hG   wy) 

wyy
wy
  hGG
hG

hG [ ( Ce)  peq:] (e  e)

peq:=Ds;
which proves (A1).
A3. The numerical model
The parameters i and ii for the US, the EU, Brazil, Russia and Japan are calibrated by
assuming i) i = 2 and ii) that their level of taxation is optimal e.g. i  iiGi = 1. The parameter
values are kept constant in all simulations.
For China, Indonesia and India we assume that in the unconstrained equilibrium they would
have liked to set the tax rate to 0:33 e.g. the average of the unconstrained countries. Moreover, we
run simulations in which we x the marginal benet of public funds to a given number i. This
yields:
i =
 ii  Gi
 i  Gi
ii =
i   1
 i  Gi
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where  i = p(ei  ei )+ 0; 33

wi0   ci2 (eoi   ei )2

. In Table A1 we show the parametervalues when
the marginal benet of public funds, i   iiGi, is equal to 2 for the scally constrained countries.
Tabel A1 Data for the model countries
Countries GHG BaU percent w. GDP Bill $ Tax revenue Reference Callibrated Callibrated Callibrated Marginal B
Mega t. 2012 percent GDP Public G etta-i etta-ii C-i of G
World 44111,11 100 %
China 7225,4 16,38 % 8227 17 % 1 399 3,02 0,00073 6,3E-05 2,00
US 6933,8 15,72 % 16245 27 % 4 370 2,00 0,00023 1,4E-04 1,00
EU 5331,5 12,09 % 16584 39 % 6 435 2,00 0,00016 2,3E-04 1,00
Brazil 2854,8 6,47 % 2253 34 % 766 2,00 0,00131 1,1E-04 1,00
Indonesia 2038,9 4,62 % 878 12 % 105 2,40 0,00380 8,4E-05 2,00
Russia 2012,8 4,56 % 2015 37 % 743 2,00 0,00135 2,0E-04 1,00
India 1875,5 4,25 % 1842 18 % 326 3,08 0,00330 2,1E-04 2,00
Japan 1390,3 3,15 % 5960 28 % 1 687 2,00 0,00059 1,2E-03 1,00
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